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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         In this Title VII matter, we must determine whether the 
Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway violated that 
statute when it made race a factor in selecting which of two 
equally qualified employees to lay off.  Specifically, we must 
decide whether Title VII permits an employer with a racially 
balanced work force to grant a non-remedial racial preference in 
order to promote "racial diversity".   
         It is clear that the language of Title VII is violated 
when an employer makes an employment decision based upon an 
employee's race.  The Supreme Court determined in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), however, that Title 
VII's prohibition against racial discrimination is not violated 
by affirmative action plans which first, "have purposes that 
mirror those of the statute" and second, do not "unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the [non-minority] employees," id. at 
208.   
         We hold that Piscataway's affirmative action policy is 
unlawful because it fails to satisfy either prong of Weber.  
Given the clear antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII, a non- 
remedial affirmative action plan, even one with a laudable 
purpose, cannot pass muster.  We will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to Sharon Taxman. 
 
I. 
         In 1975, the Board of Education of the Township of 
Piscataway, New Jersey, developed an affirmative action policy 
applicable to employment decisions.  The Board's Affirmative 
Action Program, a 52-page document, was originally adopted in 
response to a regulation promulgated by the New Jersey State 
Board of Education.  That regulation directed local school boards 
to adopt "affirmative action programs," N.J. Admin. Code Tit. 6 § 
6:4-1.3(b), to address employment as well as school and classroom 
practices and to ensure equal opportunity to all persons 
regardless of race, color, creed, religion, sex or national 
origin.  N.J. Admin. Code Tit. 6 §§ 6:4-1.5, 6:4-1.6(a).  In 1983 
the Board also adopted a one page "Policy", entitled "Affirmative 
Action - Employment Practices."  It is not clear from the record 
whether the "Policy" superseded or simply added to the "Program," 
nor does it matter for purposes of this appeal. 
         The 1975 document states that the purpose of the 
Program is "to provide equal educational opportunity for students 
and equal employment opportunity for employees and prospective 
employees," and "to make a concentrated effort to attract . . .   
minority personnel for all positions so that their qualifications 
can be evaluated along with other candidates."  The 1983 document 
states that its purpose is to "ensure[] equal employment 
opportunity . . . and prohibit[] discrimination in employment 
because of [,inter alia,] race. . . ."   
         The operative language regarding the means by which 
affirmative-action goals are to be furthered is identical in the 
two documents.  "In all cases, the most qualified candidate will 
be recommended for appointment.  However, when candidates appear 
to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting the criteria of 
the affirmative action program will be recommended."  The phrase 
"candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action 
program" refers to members of racial, national origin or gender 
groups identified as minorities for statistical reporting 
purposes by the New Jersey State Department of Education, 
including Blacks.  The 1983 document also clarifies that the 
affirmative action program applies to "every aspect of employment 
including . . . layoffs . . . ." 
         The Board's affirmative action policy did not have "any 
remedial purpose"; it was not adopted "with the intention of 
remedying the results of any prior discrimination or identified 
underrepresentation of minorities within the Piscataway Public 
School System."  At all relevant times, Black teachers were 
neither "underrepresented" nor "underutilized" in the Piscataway 
School District work force.  Indeed, statistics in 1976 and 1985 
showed that the percentage of Black employees in the job category 
which included teachers exceeded the percentage of Blacks in the 
available work force.   
 
                                A. 
         In May, 1989, the Board accepted a recommendation from 
the Superintendent of Schools to reduce the teaching staff in the 
Business Department at Piscataway High School by one.  At that 
time, two of the teachers in the department were of equal 
seniority, both having begun their employment with the Board on 
the same day nine years earlier.  One of those teachers was 
intervenor plaintiff Sharon Taxman, who is White, and the other 
was Debra Williams, who is Black.  Williams was the only minority 
teacher among the faculty of the Business Department.   
         Decisions regarding layoffs by New Jersey school boards 
are highly circumscribed by state law; nontenured faculty must be 
laid off first, and layoffs among tenured teachers in the 
affected subject area or grade level must proceed in reverse 
order of seniority.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:28-9 et seq.  
Seniority for this purpose is calculated according to specific 
guidelines set by state law.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:28-10; N.J. 
Admin. Code Tit. 6 § 6:3-5.1.  Thus, local boards lack discretion 
to choose between employees for layoff, except in the rare 
instance of a tie in seniority between the two or more employees 
eligible to fill the last remaining position.   
         The Board determined that it was facing just such a 
rare circumstance in deciding between Taxman and Williams.  In 
prior decisions involving the layoff of employees with equal 
seniority, the Board had broken the tie through "a random process 
which included drawing numbers out of a container, drawing lots 
or having a lottery."  In none of those instances, however, had 
the employees involved been of different races.   
         In light of the unique posture of the layoff decision, 
Superintendent of Schools Burton Edelchick recommended to the 
Board that the affirmative action plan be invoked in order to 
determine which teacher to retain.  Superintendent Edelchick made 
this recommendation "because he believed Ms. Williams and Ms. 
Taxman were tied in seniority, were equally qualified, and 
because Ms. Williams was the only Black teacher in the Business 
Education Department."   
         While the Board recognized that it was not bound to 
apply the affirmative action policy, it made a discretionary 
decision to invoke the policy to break the tie between Williams 
and Taxman.  As a result, the Board "voted to terminate the 
employment of Sharon Taxman, effective June 30, 1988. . . ."  
         At her deposition, Paula Van Riper, the Board's Vice 
President at the time of the layoff, described the Board's 
decision-making process.  According to Van Riper, after the Board 
recognized that Taxman and Williams were of equal seniority, it 
assessed their classroom performance, evaluations, volunteerism 
and certifications and determined that they were "two teachers of 
equal ability" and "equal qualifications."   
         At his deposition Theodore H. Kruse, the Board's 
President, explained his vote to apply the affirmative action 
policy as follows:   
         A.   Basically I think because I had been 
         aware that the student body and the community 
         which is our responsibility, the schools of 
         the community, is really quite diverse and 
         there -- I have a general feeling during my 
         tenure on the board that it was valuable for 
         the students to see in the various employment 
         roles a wide range of background, and that it 
         was also valuable to the work force and in 
         particular to the teaching staff that they 
         have -- they see that in each other. 
         Asked to articulate the "educational objective" served 
by retaining Williams rather than Taxman, Kruse stated: 
         A.   In my own personal perspective I believe 
         by retaining Mrs. Williams it was sending a 
         very clear message that we feel that our 
         staff should be culturally diverse, our 
         student population is culturally diverse and 
         there is a distinct advantage to students, to 
         all students, to be made -- come into contact 
         with people of different cultures, different 
         background, so that they are more aware, more 
         tolerant, more accepting, more understanding 
         of people of all background. 
 
         Q.   What do you mean by the phrase you used, 
         culturally diverse? 
 
         A.   Someone other than -- different than 
         yourself.  And we have, our student 
         population and our community has people of 
         all different background, ethnic background, 
         religious background, cultural background, 
         and it's important that our school district 
         encourage awareness and acceptance and 
         tolerance and, therefore, I personally think 
         it's important that our staff reflect that 
         too. 
 
                                B. 
         Following the Board's decision, Taxman filed a charge 
of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  Attempts at conciliation were 
unsuccessful, and the United States filed suit under Title VII 
against the Board in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  Taxman intervened, asserting claims 
under both Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (NJLAD). 
         Following discovery, the Board moved for summary 
judgment and the United States and Taxman cross-moved for partial 
summary judgment only as to liability.  The district court denied 
the Board's motion and granted partial summary judgment to the 
United States and Taxman, holding the Board liable under both 
statutes for discrimination on the basis of race.  United States 
v. Board of Educ. of Township Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. 836, 851 
(D.N.J. 1993).   
         A trial proceeded on the issue of damages.  By this 
time, Taxman had been rehired by the Board and thus her 
reinstatement was not an issue.  The court awarded Taxman damages 
in the amount of $134,014.62 for backpay, fringe benefits and 
prejudgment interest under Title VII.  A jury awarded an 
additional $10,000 for emotional suffering under the NJLAD.  The 
district court denied the United States' request for a broadly 
worded injunction against future discrimination, finding that 
there was no likelihood that the conduct at issue would recur, 
but it did order the Board to give Taxman full seniority 
reflecting continuous employment from 1980.  Additionally, the 
court dismissed Taxman's claim for punitive damages under the 
NJLAD. 
         The Board appealed, contending that the district court 
erred in granting Taxman summary judgment as to liability.  The 
Board also contends, in the alternative, that the court erred in 
awarding Taxman 100% backpay and in awarding prejudgment interest 
at the IRS rate rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1961.  Taxman 
cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred in 
dismissing her claim for punitive damages.  Subsequently, the 
United States sought leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in 
support of reversal of the judgment, representing that it could 
no longer support the judgment of the district court.  By order 
of November 17, 1995, we denied the United States' request.  We 
treated the position of the United States at the original 
argument before this court on January 24, 1995, as a motion to 
withdraw as a party, which we granted.  Thus, the only parties 
before us on this appeal are the Board and Taxman. 
         This court has jurisdiction over the appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the district court's decision on 
summary judgment is plenary.  Waldron v. SL Industries, 56 F.3d 
491, 496 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
                               II. 
         In relevant part, Title VII makes it unlawful for an 
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" 
or "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise affect his status as an 
employee" on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  For a time, the 
Supreme Court construed this language as absolutely prohibiting 
discrimination in employment, neither requiring nor permitting 
any preference for any group.  Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 643 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing, inter alia, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971), and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976)). 
         In 1979, however, the Court interpreted the statute's 
"antidiscriminatory strategy" in a "fundamentally different way", 
id. at 644, holding in the seminal case of United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 433 U.S. 193 (1979), that Title VII's prohibition against 
racial discrimination does not condemn all voluntary race- 
conscious affirmative action plans.  In Weber, the Court 
considered a plan implemented by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Corporation.  Prior to 1974, Kaiser hired as craftworkers only 
those with prior craft experience.  Id. at 198.  Because they had 
long been excluded from craft unions, Blacks were unable to 
present the credentials required for craft positions.  Id.  
Moreover, Kaiser's hiring practices, although not admittedly 
discriminatory with regard to minorities, were questionable.  Id.at 210.  
As a consequence, while the local labor force was about 
39% Black, Kaiser's labor force was less than 15% Black and its 
crafts-work force was less than 2% Black.  Id. at 198.  In 1974, 
Kaiser entered into a collective bargaining agreement which 
contained an affirmative action plan.  The plan reserved 50% of 
the openings in an in-plant craft-training program for Black 
employees until the percentage of Black craft-workers in the 
plant reached a level commensurate with the percentage of Blacks 
in the local labor force.  Id. at 198.  During the first year of 
the plan's operation, 13 craft-trainees were selected, seven of 
whom were Black and six of whom were White.  Id. at 199. 
         Thereafter, Brian Weber, a White production worker, 
filed a class action suit, alleging that the plan unlawfully 
discriminated against White employees under Title VII.  Relying 
upon a literal reading of subsections 2000-3(2)(a) and (d) of 
the Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a), (d), and upon the Court's 
decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 
273, where the Court held that Title VII forbids discrimination 
against Whites as well as Blacks, the plaintiffs argued that it 
necessarily followed that the Kaiser plan, which resulted in 
junior Black employees receiving craft training in preference to 
senior White employees, violated Title VII.  Id. at 199.  The 
district court agreed and entered a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs; the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  
Id. at 200. 
         The Supreme Court, however, reversed, noting initially 
that although the plaintiffs' argument was not "without force", 
it disregarded "the significance of the fact that the Kaiser-USWA 
plan was an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by 
private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial 
segregation."  Id. at 201.  The Court then embarked upon an 
exhaustive review of Title VII's legislative history and 
identified Congress' concerns in enacting Title VII's prohibition 
against discrimination -- the deplorable status of Blacks in the 
nation's economy, racial injustice, and the need to open 
employment opportunities for Blacks in traditionally closed 
occupations.  Id. at 202-204.  Against this background, the Court 
concluded that Congress could not have intended to prohibit 
private employers from implementing programs directed toward the 
very goal of Title VII -- the eradication of discrimination and 
its effects from the workplace: 
         It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered 
         by a Nation's concern over centuries of 
         racial injustice and intended to improve the 
         lot of those who had "been excluded from the 
         American dream for so long," 110 Cong. Rec. 
         6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 
         constituted the first legislative prohibition 
         of all voluntary, private, race-conscious 
         efforts to abolish traditional patterns of 
         racial segregation and hierarchy. 
 
Id. at 204. 
         The Court found support for its conclusion in the 
language and legislative history of section 2000e-2(j) of Title 
VII which expressly provides that nothing in the Act requires 
employers to grant racial preferences. According to the Court, 
the opponents of Title VII had raised two arguments:  the Act 
would be construed to impose obligations upon employers to 
integrate their work forces through preferential treatment of 
minorities, and even without being obligated to do so, employers 
with racially imbalanced work forces would grant racial 
preferences.  Id. at 205.  Since Congress addressed only the 
first objection and did not specifically prohibit affirmative 
action efforts in section 2000e-2(j), the Court inferred that 
Congress did not intend that Title VII forbid all voluntary race- 
conscious preferences.  Id. at 205-06.  The Court further 
reasoned that since Congress also intended in section 2000e-2(j) 
"to avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses," a 
prohibition against all voluntary affirmative action would 
disserve this end by "augment[ing] the power of the Federal 
government and diminish[ing] traditional management prerogatives. 
. . ."  Id. at 206-07.   
         The Court then turned to the Kaiser plan in order to 
determine whether it fell on the "permissible" side of the "line 
of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative 
action plans."  Id. at 208.  The Court upheld the Kaiser plan 
because its purpose "mirror[ed] those of the statute" and it did 
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the [non-minority] 
employees": 
         The purposes of the plan mirror those of the 
         statute.  Both were designed to break down 
         old patterns of racial segregation and 
         hierarchy.  Both were structured to "open 
         employment opportunities for Negroes in 
         occupations which have been traditionally 
         closed to them."  110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) 
         (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
 
              At the same time, the plan does not 
         unnecessarily trammel the interests of the 
         white employees.  The plan does not require 
         the discharge of white workers and their 
         replacement with new black hires.  Nor does 
         the plan create an absolute bar to the 
         advancement of white employees; half of those 
         trained in the program will be white.  
         Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it 
         is not intended to maintain racial balance, 
         but simply to eliminate a manifest racial 
         imbalance.   
 
Id. at 208 (citation and footnote omitted). 
         In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a second Title VII 
affirmative action case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa 
Clara County, 480 U.S. at 616.  There, the Santa Clara County 
Transit District Board of Supervisors implemented an affirmative 
action plan stating that "`mere prohibition of discriminatory 
practices [was] not enough to remedy the effects of past 
discriminatory practices and to permit attainment of an equitable 
representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons.'"  
Id. at 620.  The plan noted that women were represented in 
numbers far less than their proportion of the available work 
force in the Agency as a whole and in the skilled craft worker 
job category relevant to the case, and observed that a lack of 
motivation in women to seek training or employment where 
opportunities were limited partially explained the 
underrepresentation.  Id. at 621.  The plan authorized the Agency 
to consider as one factor the gender of a qualified candidate in 
making promotions to positions with a traditionally segregated 
job classification in which women were significantly 
underrepresented.  Id. at 620-21.  The plan did not set quotas, 
but had as its long-term goal the attainment of a work force 
whose composition reflected the proportion of women in the area 
labor force.  Id. at 621-22.  Acknowledging the practical 
difficulties in attaining the long-term goal, including the 
limited number of qualified women, the plan counseled that short- 
range goals be established and annually adjusted to serve as 
realistic guides for actual employment decisions.  Id. at 622. 
         On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy 
for the promotional position of road dispatcher.  At the time, 
none of the 238 positions in the applicable job category was 
occupied by a woman.  Id. at 621.  The Agency Director, 
authorized to choose any of seven applicants who had been deemed 
eligible, promoted Diane Joyce, a qualified woman, over Paul 
Johnson, a qualified man.  Id. at 624-25.  As the Agency Director 
testified:  "`I tried to look at the whole picture, the 
combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's 
qualifications, their test scores, their expertise, their 
background, affirmative action matters, things like that . . . I 
believe it was a combination of all those.'"  Id. at 625. 
         Johnson sued, alleging that the Agency's employment 
decision constituted unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.  
Evaluating the plan against the criteria announced in Weber, the 
district court held that the plan did not satisfy Weber's 
criterion that the plan be temporary.  Id. at 625.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that since the 
plan provided for the attainment, rather than the maintenance, of 
a balanced work force, the absence of an express termination date 
in the plan was not dispositive of its validity.  Id. at 625-26.  
The court of appeals further held that the plan had been adopted 
"to address a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force, 
and neither unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other 
employees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement."  
Id. at 626. 
         The Supreme Court affirmed.  Declaring its prior 
analysis in Weber controlling, the Court examined whether the 
employment decision at issue "was made pursuant to a plan 
prompted by concerns similar to those of the employer in Weber" 
and whether "the effect of the [p]lan on males and nonminorities 
[was] comparable to the effects of the plan in that case."  Id.at 631.  
The first issue the Court addressed, therefore, was 
whether "consideration of the sex of applicants for Skilled Craft 
jobs was justified by the existence of a `manifest imbalance' 
that reflected underrepresentation of women in `traditionally 
segregated job categories.'"  Id. at 631 (quoting Weber, 433 U.S. 
at 197).  Although the Court did not set forth a quantitative 
measure for determining what degree of disproportionate 
representation in an employer's work force would be sufficient to 
justify affirmative action, it made clear that the terms 
"manifest imbalance" and "traditionally segregated job category" 
were not tantamount to a prima facie case of discrimination 
against an employer since the constraints of Title VII and the 
Federal Constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action 
plans are not identical.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.  In this 
regard, the Court further reasoned that requiring an employer in 
a Title VII affirmative action case to show that it had 
discriminated in the past "would be inconsistent with Weber's 
focus on statistical imbalance, and could inappropriately create 
a significant discentive for employers to adopt an affirmative 
action plan".  Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).   
         Reviewing Agency statistics which showed that women 
were concentrated in traditionally female jobs and represented a 
lower percentage in other jobs than would be expected if 
traditional segregation had not occurred, the Court concluded 
that the decision to promote Joyce was made pursuant to a plan 
designed to eliminate work force imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories and thus satisfied Weber's first prong.  
Id. at 634.  Moving to Weber's second prong, whether the plan 
unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees, the Court 
concluded that the plan passed muster because it authorized 
merely that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns 
when evaluating applicants; gender was a "plus" factor, only one 
of several criteria that the Agency Director considered in making 
his decision; no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the 
part of Johnson was denied since the Agency Director could have 
promoted any of the seven candidates classified as eligible; even 
though Johnson was refused a promotion, he retained his 
employment; and the plan was intended to attain a balanced work 
force, not to maintain one.  Id. at 638-40. 
 
                               III. 
         We analyze Taxman's claim of employment discrimination 
under the approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792 (1978).  Once a plaintiff establishes a prima faciecase, the 
burden of production shifts to the employer to show a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the decision; an 
affirmative action plan may be one such reason.  Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626 
(1987).  When the employer satisfies this requirement, the burden 
of production shifts back to the employee to show that the 
asserted nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext and that the 
affirmative action plan is invalid.  Id. 
         For summary judgment purposes, the parties do not 
dispute that Taxman has established a prima facie case or that 
the Board's decision to terminate her was based on its 
affirmative action policy.  The dispositive liability issue, 
therefore, is the validity of the Board's policy under Title VII. 
 
                               IV. 
         Having reviewed the analytical framework for assessing 
the validity of an affirmative action plan as established in 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and refined in 
Johnson, 490 U.S. at 616, we turn to the facts of this case in 
order to determine whether the racial diversity purpose of the 
Board's policy mirrors the purposes of the statute.  We look for 
the purposes of Title VII in the plain meaning of the Act's 
provisions and in its legislative history and historical context.  
See Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987) (in 
determining a statute's purpose, courts look to the statute's 
words, legislative history, historical context and the sequence 
of events leading to its passage). 
 
                                A. 
         Title VII was enacted to further two primary goals:  to 
end discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin, thereby guaranteeing equal opportunity in the 
workplace, and to remedy the segregation and underrepresentation 
of minorities that discrimination has caused in our Nation's work 
force. 
         Title VII's first purpose is set forth in section 
2000e-2's several prohibitions, which expressly denounce the 
discrimination which Congress sought to end.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 
2(a)-(d),(l); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800 ("The language 
of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens.").            This antidiscriminatory purpose is also reflected 
in the Act's legislative history.  In an interpretative 
memorandum entered into the Congressional Record, Senators Case 
and Clark, comanagers of the Senate bill, stated: 
         To discriminate is to make a distinction, to 
         make a difference in treatment or favor, and 
         those distinctions or differences in 
         treatment or favor which are prohibited by 
         section 704 are those which are based on any 
         five of the forbidden criteria:  race, color, 
         religion, sex, and national origin.  Any 
         other criterion or qualification for 
         employment is not affected by this title. 
 
                              * * * 
 
         . . . [Title VII] expressly protects the 
         employer's right to insist that any 
         prospective applicant, Negro or white, must 
         meet the applicable job qualifications.  
         Indeed the very purpose of Title VII is to 
         promote hiring on the basis of job 
         qualifications, rather than on the basis of 
         race or color. 
 
110 Cong. Rec. 7213, 7247 (1964), quoted in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989). 
         Title VII's second purpose, ending the segregative 
effects of discrimination, is revealed in the congressional 
debate surrounding the statute's enactment.  In Weber, the Court 
carefully catalogued the comments made by the proponents of Title 
VII which demonstrate the Act's remedial concerns.  Weber, 433 
U.S. at 202-04.  By way of illustration, we cite Senator Clark's 
remarks to the Senate: 
         The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up 
         consistently as compared with white 
         unemployment for the past 15 years.  This is 
         a social malaise and a social situation which 
         we should not tolerate.  That is one of the 
         principal reasons why the bill should pass.  
 
Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. at 7220) (statement of Sen. Clark).   
Likewise, Senator Humphrey spoke of the Nation's need "`to open 
employment opportunities for Negroes which have been 
traditionally closed to them,'" and to assist those who have 
"`been excluded from the American dream for so long[.]'"  Id.(quoting 110 
Cong. Rec. at 6548, 6552) (statements of Sen. 
Humphrey).  
         The significance of this second corrective purpose 
cannot be overstated.  It is only because Title VII was written 
to eradicate not only discrimination per se but the consequencesof prior 
discrimination as well, that racial preferences in the 
form of affirmative action can co-exist with the Act's 
antidiscrimination mandate.   
         Thus, based on our analysis of Title VII's two goals, 
we are convinced that unless an affirmative action plan has a 
remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the purposes of the 
statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy the first prong of the 
Weber test.  
         We see this case as one involving straightforward 
statutory interpretation controlled by the text and legislative 
history of Title VII as interpreted in Weber and Johnson.  The 
statute on its face provides that race cannot be a factor in 
employer decisions about hires, promotions, and layoffs, and the 
legislative history demonstrates that barring considerations of 
race from the workplace was Congress' primary objective.  If 
exceptions to this bar are to be made, they must be made on the 
basis of what Congress has said.  The affirmative action plans at 
issue in Weber and Johnson were sustained only because the 
Supreme Court, examining those plans in light of congressional 
intent, found a secondary congressional objective in Title VII 
that had to be accommodated -- i.e., the elimination of the 
effects of past discrimination in the workplace.  Here, there is 
no congressional recognition of diversity as a Title VII 
objective requiring accommodation. 
         Accordingly, it is beyond cavil that the Board, by 
invoking its affirmative action policy to lay off Sharon Taxman, 
violated the terms of Title VII.  While the Court in Weber and 
Johnson permitted some deviation from the antidiscrimination 
mandate of the statute in order to erase the effects of past 
discrimination, these rulings do not open the door to additional 
non-remedial deviations.  Here, as in Weber and Johnson, the 
Board must justify its deviation from the statutory mandate based 
on positive legislative history, not on its idea of what is 
appropriate. 
 
                                B. 
         The Board recognizes that there is no positive 
legislative history supporting its goal of promoting racial 
diversity "for education's sake", and concedes that there is no 
caselaw approving such a purpose to support an affirmative action 
plan under Title VII.  "[T]he Board would have [us] infer the 
propriety of this purpose from fragments of other authority."  
Board of Educ. of Township of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. at 845. 
         The Board first attempts to meet its obligations with 
respect to Title VII by arguing that Congress meant to cover the 
situation presented here "when it amended Title VII in 1972 to 
cover academic institutions public and private."  A review of a 
Senate Committee's explanation for recommending the amendment, 
however, reveals that Congress neither addressed nor embraced the 
racial diversity purpose before us.  Instead, Congress pursued, 
in Title VII's 1972 amendment with regard to the nation's 
schools, the same purposes it had pursued in 1964 when enacting 
the original statute with respect to other employers, namely, the 
elimination of discriminatory employment practices and the 
abolition of discrimination's invidious effects: 
              The presence of discrimination in the 
         Nation's educational institutions is no 
         secret. . . .  This discrimination, however, 
         is not limited to the students alone.  
         Discriminatory practices against faculty, 
         staff, and other employees is also common. 
 
              As in other areas of employment, 
         statistics for educational institutions 
         indicate that minorities and women are 
         precluded from the more prestigious and 
         higher-paying positions, and are relegated to 
         the more menial and lower-paying jobs.  While 
         in elementary and secondary school systems 
         Negroes accounted for approximately 10% of 
         the total number of positions in the higher- 
         paying and more prestigious positions in 
         institutions of higher learning, blacks 
         constituted only 2.2% of all positions, most 
         of these being found in all-black or 
         predominantly black institutions.  Women are 
         similarly subject to discriminatory patterns.  
         Not only are they generally under-represented 
         in institutions of higher learning, but those 
         few that do obtain positions are generally 
         paid less and advanced more slowly than their 
         male counterparts.  Similarly, while women 
         constitute 67% of elementary and secondary 
         school teachers, out of 778,000 elementary 
         and secondary school principals, 78% of 
         elementary school principals are men and 94% 
         of secondary school principals are men. 
 
              . . .  There is nothing in the 
         legislative background of Title VII, nor does 
         any national policy suggest itself, to 
         support the present exemption.  In fact, the 
         Committee believes that the existence of 
         discrimination in educational institutions is 
         particularly critical.  It is difficult to 
         imagine a more sensitive area than 
         educational institutions, where the youth of 
         the Nation are exposed to a multitude of 
         ideas and impressions that will strongly 
         influence their future development.  To 
         permit discrimination here would, more than 
         in any other area, tend to promote existing 
         misconceptions and stereotypical 
         categorizations which in turn would lead to 
         future patterns of discrimination. 
 
S.Rep. 415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971).  See Johnson, 480 
U.S. at 627-28 n.6 ("While public employers were not added to the 
definition of `employer' in Title VII until 1972, there is no 
evidence that this mere addition to the definitional section of 
the statute was intended to transform the substantive standard 
governing employer conduct."). 
         We find the Board's reliance on Fourteenth Amendment 
caselaw misplaced as well.  We are acutely aware, as is the 
Board, that the federal courts have never decided a "pure" Title 
VII case where racial diversity for education's sake was advanced 
as the sole justification for a race-based decision.  The Board 
argues that in deciding just such a case, we should look to the 
Supreme Court's endorsement of diversity as a goal in the Equal 
Protection context.  This argument, however, is based upon a 
faulty premise.  
         In relying on Equal Protection cases to support its 
diversity goal, we understand the Board to reason as follows:  
The Supreme Court observed in Johnson that "the statutory 
prohibition [in Title VII] with which an employer must contend 
was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution", 
480 U.S. at 628 n.6.  Accordingly, a purpose which survives 
constitutional strict scrutiny necessarily passes muster under 
Title VII's permissible purpose test -- since the Court has 
endorsed the concept of diversity in Equal Protection cases, it 
would approve the Board's diversity purpose in this Title VII 
case, where the limitations on purpose are less stringent.   
         We are convinced, however, that Johnson's footnote six, 
480 U.S. at 627-28 n.6, in which the Court contrasted the reach 
of Title VII with that of the Constitution, does not speak to the 
purposes that may support affirmative action under the former but 
not the latter.  We read the Court's observation to relate, 
instead, to the factual predicate that employers must offer to 
prove the need for remedial efforts in Title VII as contrasted 
with Equal Protection affirmative action cases.   
         In Johnson, the Court held that the legality of the 
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency's plan under Title VII 
must be guided by the Court's determination in Weber that 
affirmative action is lawful if an employer can point to a 
"`manifest imbalance . . . in traditionally segregated job 
categories.'"  480 U.S. at 630-32 (quoting Weber, 433 U.S. at 
197).  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
(1986), by contrast, the Court determined that under the 
Constitution a public employer's remedial affirmative action 
initiatives are valid only if crafted to remedy its own past or 
present discrimination; that is, societal discrimination is an 
insufficient basis for "imposing discretionary legal remedies 
against innocent people."  Id. at 274-76.  In the plurality's 
words, affirmative action must be supported by "a factual 
determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence 
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary."  Id. at 
277.   
         When the Court in Johnson observed that Title VII's 
statutory prohibition does not extend as far as the Constitution, 
it was addressing one of Justice Scalia's arguments in dissent 
that since obligations under Title VII and the Constitution are 
identical, a public employer's adoption of an affirmative action 
plan in a Title VII case should be governed by the prior 
discrimination standard set forth in Wygant.  Johnson, 480 U.S. 
at 627-28 n.6. 
 
         While the Supreme Court may indeed at some future date 
hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies the 
Constitution must necessarily satisfy Title VII, it has yet to do 
so.  
         Were we to accept that equal protection standards may 
be imported into Title VII analysis, we are still unpersuaded 
that the Equal Protection caselaw validates the Board's asserted 
goal of racial diversity.  We cannot agree with the Board that 
the racial diversity purpose is supported by both the Supreme 
Court's holding and the dissenting opinions in Wygant.  The Court 
in Wygant, although divided, agreed that under the Equal 
Protection Clause, racial classifications in the context of 
affirmative action must be justified by a compelling state 
purpose and the means chosen to effectuate that purpose must be 
narrowly tailored; that societal discrimination alone will not 
justify a racial classification; that evidence of prior 
discrimination by an employer must be presented before remedial 
racial classifications can be employed; and that the "role model" 
theory proposed by the employer as a basis for race-conscious 
state action was unacceptable because it would have allowed 
discriminatory hiring and layoff well beyond the point necessary 
for any remedial purpose and did not bear any relationship to the 
harm caused by prior discrimination.  Id. at 270-78; id. at 284- 
93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
Court's judgment); id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the 
Court's judgment).  The dissenting Justices believed that the 
Constitution would allow a public employer to preserve the 
integration it had achieved through a legitimate affirmative 
action hiring plan by thereafter apportioning layoffs between 
minority and nonminority groups.  Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 267-68 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).      
         We are also unpersuaded by the Board's contention that 
Equal Protection cases arising in an education context support 
upholding the Board's purpose in a Title VII action.  These Equal 
Protection cases, unlike the case at hand, involved corrective 
efforts to confront racial segregation or chronic minority 
underrepresentation in the schools.  In this context, we are not 
at all surprised that the goal of diversity was raised.  While we 
wholeheartedly endorse any statements in these cases extolling 
the educational value of exposing students to persons of diverse 
races and backgrounds, given the framework in which they were 
made, we cannot accept them as authority for the conclusion that 
the Board's non-remedial racial diversity goal is a permissible 
basis for affirmative action under Title VII.  See, e.g., Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
racially-conscious layoff provision at issue was aimed at 
preserving the faculty integration achieved by the Jackson, 
Michigan Public Schools in the early 1970s through affirmative 
action; minority representation went from 3.9% in 1969 to 8.8% in 
1971); Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 467 
(1979) (condemning intentional segregation and the creation of 
racially-identifiable schools practiced by the Columbus, Ohio 
Board of Education); Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing the 
judgment of the Court) (observing that the 1968 class of the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis contained 
three Asians, no Blacks, no Mexican-Americans and no American 
Indians); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U.S. 1 (1971) (observing that 14,000 Black pupils in the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina school system attended 21 
schools that were at least 99% Black); Kromnick v. School Dist. 
of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 897 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing 
that "[t]he Philadelphia School System has long suffered from defacto 
segregation by race of students and faculty"), cert.denied, 469 U.S. 1107 
(1985).   
         More specifically, two Supreme Court cases upon which 
the Board relies, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, and Metro Broadcasting 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), are inapposite.  Bakke involved 
a rejected White applicant's challenge under the Constitution and 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, to a 
special admissions program instituted by the Medical School of 
the University of California at Davis which essentially set aside 
16 places for minority candidates.  Justice Powell, whose vote 
was necessary both to establish the validity of considering race 
in admission decisions and to invalidate the racial quota before 
the Court, was of the opinion that the attainment of a "diverse 
student body" is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education.  Justice Powell pointed out that 
the academic freedom that has been viewed as a "special concern" 
of the First Amendment includes "the freedom of a university to 
make its own judgments as to the selection of its student body" 
and that "[t]he atmosphere of `speculation, experiment and 
creation' -- so essential to the quality of higher education -- 
is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."  
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (footnote omitted).  He then agreed with 
Davis' assertion that its interest in diversity implicated First 
Amendment concerns:   
              Thus, in arguing that its universities 
         must be accorded the right to select those 
         students who will contribute the most to the 
         "robust exchange of ideas," [Davis] invokes a 
         countervailing constitutional interest, that 
         of the First Amendment.  In this light, 
         petitioner must be viewed as seeking to 
         achieve a goal that is of paramount 
         importance in the fulfillment of its mission. 
 
Id. at 313.  
         Davis' reservation of a specified number of seats in 
each class for individuals from preferred ethnic groups to 
further its diversity purpose, however, was unacceptable because, 
according to Justice Powell, it misconceived the nature of the 
state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic 
background: 
         It is not an interest in simple ethnic 
         diversity, in which a specified percentage of 
         the student body is in effect guaranteed to 
         be members of selected ethnic groups, with 
         the remaining percentage an undifferentiated 
         aggregation of students.  The diversity that 
         furthers a compelling state interest 
         encompasses a far broader array of 
         qualifications and characteristics of which 
         racial or ethnic origin is but a single 
         though important element.  Davis' special 
         admissions program, focused solely on ethnic 
         diversity, would hinder rather than further 
         attainment of genuine diversity.  
 
Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).          
         Bakke's factual and legal setting, as well as the 
diversity that universities aspire to in their student bodies, 
are, in our view, so different from the facts, relevant law and 
the racial diversity purpose involved in this case that we find 
little in Bakke to guide us. 
         Likewise, statements regarding the value of programming 
diversity made by the Court in Metro Broadcasting when it upheld 
two minority preference policies adopted by the Federal 
Communications Commission, 497 U.S. at 547, have no application 
here.  The diversity interest the Court found sufficient under 
the Constitution to support a racial classification had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the concerns that underlie Title VII.  
Citing Bakke, the Court concluded that "[j]ust as a `diverse 
student body' contributing to a `robust exchange of ideas' is a 
`constitutionally permissible goal' on which a race-conscious 
university admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of 
views and information on the airwaves serves important First 
Amendment values."  Id. at 568 (citation omitted).   
         Finally, we turn to the Board's argument that the 
diversity goal underlying its application of the affirmative 
action policy was endorsed in Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Wygant and in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in 
Johnson.  We find that these statements are slender reeds indeed 
and any bearing that they may have in the situation presented 
here is minimal.  While Justice O'Connor did refer favorably to 
Bakke and the notion of racial diversity in institutions of 
higher learning, Wygant, 480 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor J. 
concurring), just one year later in Johnson, a Title VII case, 
she rejected Justice Steven's expansive view of the purposes that 
may underlie affirmative action, stating:  "[C]ontrary to the 
intimations in JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence, this Court did not 
approve preferences for minorities `for any reason that might 
seem sensible from a business or social point of view.'"  
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the Court's 
judgment).  As for Justice Stevens' concurrence in Johnson, while 
he clearly pondered the idea of "forward-looking" affirmative 
action where employers do not focus on "`purg[ing] their own past 
sins of discrimination'", id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring), 
his comments are not controlling. 
 
                                V. 
         Since we have not found anything in the Board's 
arguments to convince us that this case requires examination 
beyond statutory interpretation, we return to the point at which 
we started:  the language of Title VII itself and the two cases 
reviewing affirmative action plans in light of that statute.  Our 
analysis of the statute and the caselaw convinces us that a non- 
remedial affirmative action plan cannot form the basis for 
deviating from the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII. 
         The Board admits that it did not act to remedy the 
effects of past employment discrimination.  The parties have 
stipulated that neither the Board's adoption of its affirmative 
action policy nor its subsequent decision to apply it in choosing 
between Taxman and Williams was intended to remedy the results of 
any prior discrimination or identified underrepresentation of 
Blacks within the Piscataway School District's teacher workforce 
as a whole.  Nor does the Board contend that its action here was 
directed at remedying any de jure or de facto segregation.  Butsee 
Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Burke, 386 A.2d 439 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 401 A.2d 230 (N.J. 
1978).  Even though the Board's race-conscious action was taken 
to avoid what could have been an all-White faculty within the 
Business Department, the Board concedes that Blacks are not 
underrepresented in its teaching workforce as a whole or even in 
the Piscataway High School.   
         Rather, the Board's sole purpose in applying its 
affirmative action policy in this case was to obtain an 
educational benefit which it believed would result from a 
racially diverse faculty.  While the benefits flowing from 
diversity in the educational context are significant indeed, we 
are constrained to hold, as did the district court, that inasmuch 
as "the Board does not even attempt to show that its affirmative 
action plan was adopted to remedy past discrimination or as the 
result of a manifest imbalance in the employment of minorities," 
832 F. Supp. at 845, the Board has failed to satisfy the first 
prong of the Weber test.  United States v. Board of Educ. of 
Township of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. 836, 848 (D.N.J. 1993). 
         We turn next to the second prong of the Weber analysis.  
This second prong requires that we determine whether the Board's 
policy "unnecessarily trammel[s] . . . [nonminority] interests.  
. . ."  Weber, 433 U.S. at 208.  Under this requirement, too, the 
Board's policy is deficient. 
         We begin by noting the policy's utter lack of 
definition and structure.  While it is not for us to decide how 
much diversity in a high school facility is "enough," the Board 
cannot abdicate its responsibility to define "racial diversity" 
and to determine what degree of racial diversity in the 
Piscataway School is sufficient. 
         The affirmative action plans that have met with the 
Supreme Court's approval under Title VII had objectives, as well 
as benchmarks which served to evaluate progress, guide the 
employment decisions at issue and assure the grant of only those 
minority preferences necessary to further the plans' purpose.  
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621-22 (setting forth long-range and short- 
term objectives to achieve "`a statistically measurable yearly 
improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and 
women . . . in all major job classifications where they are 
underrepresented'"); Weber, 433 U.S. at 193 (reserving for Black 
employees 50% of the openings in craft-training programs until 
the percentage of Black craftworkers reflected the percentage of 
Blacks in the available labor force).  By contrast, the Board's 
policy, devoid of goals and standards, is governed entirely by 
the Board's whim, leaving the Board free, if it so chooses, to 
grant racial preferences that do not promote even the policy's 
claimed purpose.  Indeed, under the terms of this policy, the 
Board, in pursuit of a "racially diverse" work force, could use 
affirmative action to discriminate against those whom Title VII 
was enacted to protect.  Such a policy unnecessarily trammels the 
interests of nonminority employees.    
          Moreover, both Weber and Johnson unequivocally provide 
that valid affirmative action plans are "temporary" measures that 
seek to "'attain'", not "maintain" a "permanent racial . . . 
balance."  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639-40.  See Weber, 433 U.S. at 
208.  The Board's policy, adopted in 1975, is an established 
fixture of unlimited duration, to be resurrected from time to 
time whenever the Board believes that the ratio between Blacks 
and Whites in any Piscataway School is skewed.  On this basis 
alone, the policy contravenes Weber's teaching.  See Cunico v. 
Pueblo School Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 440 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the school district's layoff decision aimed at 
ensuring the employment of the district's only Black 
administrator was "outright racial balancing" in violation of 
Weber's second prong). 
          Finally, we are convinced that the harm imposed upon a 
nonminority employee by the loss of his or her job is so 
substantial and the cost so severe that the Board's goal of 
racial diversity, even if legitimate under Title VII, may not be 
pursued in this particular fashion.  This is especially true 
where, as here, the nonminority employee is tenured.  In Weberand Johnson, 
when considering whether nonminorities were unduly 
encumbered by affirmative action, the Court found it significant 
that they retained their employment.  Weber, 433 U.S. at 208 
(observing that the plan did not require the discharge of 
nonminority workers); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638 (observing that 
the nonminority employee who was not promoted nonetheless kept 
his job).  We, therefore, adopt the plurality's pronouncement in 
Wygant that "[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often 
foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the 
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular 
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their 
lives.  That burden is too intrusive."  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 
(footnote omitted). 
         Accordingly, we conclude that under the second prong of 
the Weber test, the Board's affirmative action policy violates 
Title VII.  In addition to containing an impermissible purpose, 
the policy "unnecessarily trammel[s] the interests of the 
[nonminority] employees."  Weber, 430 U.S. at 208.  
 
                               VI. 
         The district court did not analyze Taxman's claims 
based on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and we need 
not do so in detail here.  The parties have agreed that the legal 
analysis required by the state statute is essentially the same as 
that undertaken in Title VII cases.  While the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has yet to consider a voluntarily adopted affirmative 
action plan in light of the NJLAD, it is undisputed that the 
NJLAD has been interpreted to parallel Title VII.  In Peper v. 
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978), 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote that "where [Title VII] 
standards are useful and fair, it is in the best interests of 
everyone concerned to have some uniformity in the law." 
         Given that statement, we predict that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would follow the analytical directive of Weber and 
Johnson.  Analysis of this case under the NJLAD would, therefore, 
lead to the same result as that which we have reached under Title 
VII.  Sharon Taxman is entitled to summary judgment on her claim 
made under the NJLAD.   
 
                               VII. 
         Having found the Board liable under Title VII, we turn 
our attention to the issue of damages, addressing first the 
district court's order that Taxman be awarded one hundred percent 
backpay for the entire period of her layoff.  The Board argues 
that where a backpay award is appropriate, the court's goal 
should be to restore "`the conditions and relationships that 
would have been had there been no'" unlawful discrimination.  
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371 (1977) (quoting 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976)).  
According to the Board, the district court's award of one hundred 
percent backpay was plainly unfair.  Had it not invoked the 
affirmative action plan, the Board would have followed its usual 
procedure, using a coin toss or other random process to break the 
seniority between Williams and Taxman.  Taxman, therefore, would 
have stood no more than a fifty percent chance of keeping her job 
had there been no unlawful discrimination." 
         We disagree.  In deciding backpay issues, a district 
court has wide latitude to "locate `a just result'" and to 
further the "make whole remedy of Title VII in light of the 
circumstances of a particular case."  Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975).  While Taxman cannot be 
returned to the position that she held prior to her layoff -- one 
of virtually precise equality with Williams in terms of the 
factors relevant to the decision -- she can be returned to a 
position of financial equality with Williams through a one 
hundred percent backpay award.  We are convinced that this award 
most closely approximates the conditions that would have 
prevailed in the absence of discrimination. 
         We find an additional basis for our holding in the 
analysis set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989).  In that case, the Supreme Court held that where an 
employee proves that discrimination played a role in an 
employment decision, the employer will not be found "liable if it 
can prove that, even if it had not taken [race] into account it 
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular 
person."  Id. at 242.  Here, Taxman has clearly established that 
the Board is liable and that she was not paid during the relevant 
period.  Under the logic of Hopkins, the Board cannot avoid a one 
hundred percent backpay award unless it can establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Taxman would have received 
some lesser amount had the Board not taken race into account.  
This, of course, the Board cannot do. 
         Given the law and the circumstances presented in this 
case, we are convinced that the district court's analysis with 
respect to backpay reflects the sound exercise of judicial 
discretion and we will affirm the award. 
         The Board further contends that the district court 
erred in calculating prejudgment interest using the IRS adjusted 
prime rate.  According to the Board, the district court should 
have applied the post-judgment rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
1961(a).  This argument is meritless. 
         The matter of prejudgment interest is left to the 
discretion of the district court.  Although a court "may" use the 
post-judgment standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), Sun Ship, Inc. v. 
Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986), it is not 
compelled to do so.  E.E.O.C. v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees 
Relief Ass'n., 727 F.2d 566, 579 (1984).  The adjusted prime 
rate, established periodically by the Secretary of the Treasury 
and codified in 26 U.S.C. § 6621, has been used regularly by 
district courts to calculate prejudgment interest.  See, e.g., 
E.E.O.C. v. Erie County, 751 F.2d 79, 82 (1984) (trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in using adjusted prime rate to 
calculate the amount of prejudgment interest to be paid on 
backpay award under the Equal Pay Act).   
         We thus hold that the district court's calculation of 
pre-judgment interest was consistent with the sound exercise of 
judicial discretion. 
         Finally, in her cross-appeal, Taxman asks that we find 
that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for 
punitive damages under the NJLAD. 
         At a January 5, 1994 proceeding devoted to the issue of 
damages, the district court reaffirmed a decision made at a 
pretrial conference to "strike the punitive damages claim" on the 
ground that "there is no evidence to support [it]."  (App. at 
209).  The court made the following comment with respect to 
punitive damages: 
         I didn't say I felt the board -- I may have 
         said that the board acted in good faith, but 
         I think what I did say is that there's no 
         evidence that would support any claim for 
         punitive damages.  And I struck the punitive 
         damages claim. 
 
         There's absolutely no evidence that the board 
         acted willfully, wantonly, outrageously or in 
         any other way than trying its best to make 
         the best of a very unhappy situation. 
          
         The New Jersey Supreme Court has established a high 
threshold requirement which must be met before an award of 
punitive damages can be sustained.  Punitive damages are to be 
awarded only "`when the wrongdoer's conduct is especially 
egregious.'"  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 313, 661 A.2d 
1201, 1215 (1995).  "To warrant a punitive award, the defendant's 
conduct must have been wantonly reckless or malicious.  There 
must be an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an `evil- 
minded' act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard to the 
rights of another. . . .  The key to the right to punitive 
damages is the wrongfulness of the intentional action."  Id.  
"[The New Jersey] case indicates that the requirement [of 
willfulness or wantonness] may be satisfied a showing that there 
has been a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high 
degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference or 
consequences.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  "[The New Jersey courts 
have] stated that proof of actual malice [is] "`a condition 
precedent to a punitive damages award.'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
         Having examined the record evidence in this case 
against the background of the New Jersey punitive damages 
standard, we agree with the district court that the evidence 
would not support a finding that the Board acted willfully, 
wantonly or outrageously in dismissing Taxman.  We conclude, 
therefore, that Taxman's claim for punitive damages was properly 
dismissed. 
 
                              VIII. 
         While we have rejected the argument that the Board's 
non-remedial application of the affirmative action policy is 
consistent with the language and intent of Title VII, we do not 
reject in principle the diversity goal articulated by the Board.  
Indeed, we recognize that the differences among us underlie the 
richness and strength of our Nation.  Our disposition of this 
matter, however, rests squarely on the foundation of Title VII.  
Although we applaud the goal of racial diversity, we cannot agree 
that Title VII permits an employer to advance that goal through 
non-remedial discriminatory measures.   
         Having found that the district court properly concluded 
that the affirmative action plan applied by the Board to lay off 
Taxman is invalid under Title VII, and that the district court 
did not err in calculating Taxman's damages or in dismissing her 
claim for punitive damages, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 
        TAXMAN v. BD. OF EDUC. OF THE TWP. OF PISCATAWAY, 
Nos. 94-5090, 94-5112                             
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
         I agree that the Board's non-remedial affirmative 
action decision is unlawful because non-remedial affirmative 
action employment decisions cannot pass muster under Title VII.  
It is unnecessary, however, for the court to decide whether the 
Board's actions unnecessarily trammel Taxman's interests.  
Accordingly, I would express no opinion on that issue.  I join 
the remainder of the court's opinion.     
United States of America, Sharon Taxman, Plaintiff-Intervenor  
v. Bd. of Education of the Township of Piscataway,  
Sharon Taxman, Appellant v. Bd. of Education of the Township of 
Piscataway, Nos. 94-5090, 94-5112                               
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges Lewis and 
McKee join. 
         In the law, as in other professions, it is often how 
the question is framed that determines the answer that is 
received.  Although the divisive issue of affirmative action 
continues on this country's political agenda, I do not see this 
appeal as raising a broad legal referendum on affirmative action 
policies.  Indeed, it is questionable whether this case is about 
affirmative action at all, as that term has come to be generally 
understood -- i.e. preference based on race or gender of one 
deemed "less qualified" over one deemed "more qualified."  Nor 
does this case even require us to examine the parameters of the 
affirmative action policy originally adopted in 1975 by the Board 
of Education of the Township of Piscataway (School Board or 
Board) in response to a state regulation requiring affirmative 
action programs or the Board's concise 1983 one-page Affirmative 
Action policy.  
         Instead, the narrow question posed by this appeal can 
be restated as whether Title VII requires a New Jersey school or 
school board, which is faced with deciding which of two equally 
qualified teachers should be laid off, to make its decision 
through a coin toss or lottery, a solution that could be expected 
of the state's gaming tables, or whether Title VII permits the 
school board to factor into the decision its bona fide belief, 
based on its experience with secondary schools, that students 
derive educational benefit by having a Black faculty member in an 
otherwise all-White department.  Because I believe that the area 
of discretion left to employers in educational institutions by 
Title VII encompasses the School Board's action in this case, I 
respectfully dissent. 
         The posture in which the legal issue in this case is 
presented is so stripped of extraneous factors that it could well 
serve as the question for a law school moot court.  I emphasize 
at the outset issues that this case does not present.  We need 
not decide whether it is permissible for a school to lay off a 
more qualified employee in favor of a less qualified employee on 
the basis of race, because that did not happen here.  Nor need we 
consider what requirements Title VII may impose on unwilling 
employers, or how much racial diversity in a high school faculty 
may be "enough." 
         Significantly, although the School Board is a public 
employer, this case does not place before us for decision the 
limits on race-conscious action imposed on public entities by the 
Constitution because we are presented with no constitutional 
claim.  Therefore, we must measure the Board's actions under the 
restraints imposed by Title VII rather than the more demanding 
ones imposed on government action by the Equal Protection Clause.  
In this respect the case is similar to that presented in Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 
(1987), where the Supreme Court noted that even though the 
defendant was a public employer it would decide the case only 
under Title VII because no constitutional issue was raised or 
addressed below.  See id. at 620 n.2.  The Court also made clear 
that for purposes of Title VII, the same standard applies to 
public and private employers, stating that "[t]he fact that a 
public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not 
negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that 
employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that 
of the Constitution."  Id. at 628 n.6.  This was an express 
rejection of Justice Scalia's contention "that the obligations of 
a public employer under Title VII must be identical to its 
obligations under the Constitution."  Id. at 627 n. 6; see alsoid. at 649 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Thus it is important to 
keep in mind that we must measure the Board's action in this case 
against the same standard we would apply to a private school.  
                                                                           
I. 
         When in May 1989 the School Board was faced with the 
disagreeable necessity of reducing by one the teaching staff in 
the Business Department of Piscataway High School, it recognized 
that reference to the applicable New Jersey law, which provides 
the roadmap in terms of seniority, would not suffice here because 
the two teachers had equal seniority.  The Board, which has the 
responsibility of gauging the educational requirements of the 
students under its charge, would have to resort to its own 
experience as there were no other prescribed guidelines.  It did 
not then turn to the affirmative action policy to make the 
decision based on race.  There was no built-in quota, expressed 
or implied, for minority faculty, and Taxman does not so suggest.  
On the contrary, the Board next considered a variety of 
undoubtedly relevant factors, any one of which might have tipped 
the scales in favor of laying off one teacher or the other.  Had 
Taxman been deemed a better teacher than Williams, that alone 
could have pointed the arrow in her direction.  Or, had Williams 
participated in volunteer activity while Taxman spent her spare 
time in other activities, that alone could have accounted for 
Williams' retention.  The deposition testimony of several board 
members who participated in the decision indicates that before 
the affirmative action policy was considered, a number of other 
criteria were discussed to break the tie, including work 
performance, certifications, evaluations, teaching ability, and 
volunteerism.  The two teachers with the least seniority, Taxman 
and Williams, were determined to be equal with respect to each of 
these other criteria. 
         The Board's Vice President, Paula Van Riper, testified: 
         [T]he seniority and the person's 
         qualifications came into play first.  If one 
         was more senior than the other, it would have 
         ended right there, if they were of like 
         seniority.  From that point it was based on 
         their work performance and their evaluations 
         . . . .  There was some consideration given 
         . . .  to the various other activities that 
         they did . . . .  But certainly the weight 
         would be given to their performance in the 
         classroom.  At that point we were told that 
         these are two teachers of equal ability, 
         equal qualifications, I should say.  They 
         . . . both[] had good evaluations, they were 
         good teachers, they were supportive of the 
         school district, volunteered in various ways 
         and they . . .  had similar certification or 
         like certification and their seniority was 




         The equal position of both teachers in light of all 
relevant criteria was also stressed by the Director of Personnel, 
Gordon Moore, who explained:  "we . . . concluded that work 
history or performance criteria [were] not going to be usable in 
breaking the tie, because there was no distinction that could be 
made."  Da177. 
         In its opinion, the majority declares the School 
Board's affirmative action policy unlawful.  An examination of 
the so-called affirmative action policy reveals that it does 
nothing more than place before the School Board the need to 
consider minority personnel among other equally qualifiedcandidates for 
employment decisions.  Da5, 53.  That this was a 
necessary reminder in 1975 when the policy was formed can hardly 
be gainsaid.  I believe that it also was a useful reminder in 
1989, when this School Board was faced with this decision, and 
perhaps even today. 
         A review of the record makes clear that the Board did 
not view itself as bound to select Williams for retention by the 
1975 affirmative action policy, which speaks only of 
recommendations, but after discussion and consideration the Board 
made a discretionary decision to select Williams for retention to 
further the educational goal of a diverse faculty.  Da72, 94. 
         The Board members described their purpose in using the 
goal of diversity underlying the previously adopted affirmative 
action policy as a factor in the layoff decision as reflecting 
the "general feeling . . . that it was valuable for the students 
to see in the various employment roles a wide range of 
background[s]," Da74, and "the desire to have a diverse teaching 
staff in the school district."  Da175-76.  It was also intended 
to send "a very clear message that we feel that our staff should 
be culturally diverse [for the benefit of the students]" and to 
"encourage awareness and acceptance and tolerance [of people of 
all backgrounds]."  Da75.  Thus, the Board took into 
consideration that if Williams were laid off, the Business 
Department faculty at the school would be all White.  Da94, 110, 
168, 175-176. 
                               II. 
         It was the Board's decision to include the desire for a 
racially diverse faculty among the various factors entering into 
its discretionary decision that the majority of this court brands 
a Title VII violation as a matter of law.  No Supreme Court case 
compels that anomalous result.  Notwithstanding the majority's 
literal construction of the language of Title VII, no Supreme 
Court case has ever interpreted the statute to preclude 
consideration of race or sex for the purpose of insuring 
diversity in the classroom as one of many factors in an 
employment decision, the situation presented here.  Moreover, in 
the only two instances in which the Supreme Court examined under 
Title VII, without the added scrutiny imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause, affirmative action plans voluntarily adopted 
by employers that gave preference to race or sex as a 
determinative factor, the Court upheld both plans. 
         In its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court held that an agreement between a 
private company and a union that sought to remedy the historical 
exclusion of Blacks from skilled craft unions by reserving half 
the openings in an in-house training program for Blacks did not 
violate Title VII.  A scarce decade later, it reached a similar 
decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 
480 U.S. 616 (1987), where the plan that the Court upheld 
authorized consideration of the gender of a qualified applicant 
as one of various factors for promoting employees into jobs in 
which women had been significantly underrepresented.   
         The majority presents Weber and Johnson as if their 
significance lies in the obstacle course they purportedly 
establish for any employer adopting an affirmative action 
program.   But, as the Justices of the Supreme Court recognized, 
the significance of each of those cases is that the Supreme Court 
sustained the affirmative action plans presented, and in doing so 
deviated from the literal interpretation of Title VII precluding 
use of race or gender in any employment action.  As Justice 
Brennan explained in Weber, "It is a 'familiar rule that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention 
of its makers.'"  Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).  The Justices 
dissenting in those cases noted and vigorously objected to the 
departure.  See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 222, 228 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority "eludes the clear 
statutory language" and that Kaiser's affirmative action plan is 
"flatly prohibited by the plain language of Title VII"); Johnson, 
480 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is well to keep in 
mind just how thoroughly Weber rewrote the statute it purported 
to construe . . . Weber disregarded the text of the statute, 
invoking instead its 'spirit'").  
         While the majority in this case views the Supreme 
Court's articulation of the factors that rationalized its 
upholding of the affirmative action plans in those cases as 
establishing boundaries, no language in either Weber or Johnsonso states 
and, in fact, there is language to the contrary.  The 
majority draws the line at the factors used in those cases.  In 
both Weber and Johnson, the Court inquired whether consideration 
of race in the employment decision was justified by a permissible 
purpose, and then examined the effect on nonminorities to 
ascertain whether the action taken "unnecessarily trammel[ed] the 
interests of the white employees."  Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630. 
         However, it does not follow as a matter of logic that 
because the two affirmative action plans in Weber and Johnsonwhich sought 
to remedy imbalances caused by past discrimination 
withstood Title VII scrutiny, every affirmative action plan that 
pursues some purpose other than correcting a manifest imbalance 
or remedying past discrimination will run afoul of Title VII.  
Indeed, the Court in Weber explicitly cautioned that its holding 
in that case should not be read to define the outer boundaries of 
the area of discretion left to employers by Title VII for the 
voluntary adoption of affirmative action measures.  The Court 
stated: 
         We need not today define in detail the line 
         of demarcation between permissible and 
         impermissible affirmative action plans.  It 
         suffices to hold that the challenged Kaiser- 
         USWA affirmative action plan falls on the 
         permissible side of the line.  The purposes 
         of the plan mirror those of the statute.  
         Both were designed to break down old patterns 
         of racial segregation and hierarchy.  Both 
         were structured to "open employment 
         opportunities for Negroes in occupations 
         which have been traditionally closed to 
         them." 
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.  See also id. at 215-16 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)(noting that Kaiser plan "is a moderate one" and that 
"the Court's opinion does not foreclose other forms of 
affirmative action"). 
         The majority opinion in Johnson made no attempt to draw 
the line that Weber left undefined.  See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642 
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("I write . . . to . . . emphasize that 
the opinion does not establish the permissible outer limits of 
voluntary [affirmative action] programs").  Although Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion argued that permissible purposes 
under Title VII were limited to those that served to remedy past 
discrimination, Johnson 480 U.S. at 649, her vote was the sixth 
in favor of the majority's holding and therefore not crucial to 
the outcome of the case.  It follows that her narrow reading 
should not be read as constituting the view of the Court.  SeeMarks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).    
          
         The majority here has taken the language of Weber where 
the Court observed that the plan's purposes "mirrored" those of 
the statute, and has elevated it to a litmus test under which an 
affirmative action plan can only pass muster under Title VII if 
particular language in the text or legislative history of the 
statute can be identified that matches the articulated purpose of 
the plan.  Nothing in Weber suggests that the Court intended by 
its "mirroring" language to create such a rigid test. 
         In Weber, when the Court found that the purposes of the 
plan were consistent with those of Title VII, it did so by 
reference not only to the language of the legislative history, 
but to the historical context from which the Act arose as well.  
Id. at 201.  In Johnson, the Court made no attempt at all to 
identify language in the legislative history paralleling the 
particular objectives of the plan it sustained.  Thus, even in 
those cases the Court did not demonstrate the kind of close fit 
between the plan and the statutory history demanded of the Board 
in this case. 
         In Weber, the Court's examination into the purposes of 
Title VII led it to the conclusion that the Act was designed to 
promote "the integration of blacks into the mainstream of 
American society," Weber, 443 U.S. at 202, and the breakdown of 
"old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy," id. at 208.  
The Kaiser affirmative action plan was consistent with these 
sweeping, broadly stated purposes and hence was sustained. 
         Of course, I do not disagree with the majority that 
"Title VII was written to eradicate not only discrimination per 
se but the consequences of prior discrimination," but I do not 
believe that in doing so, Congress intended to limit the reach of 
Title VII to remedying past discrimination, thereby turning a 
blind eye toward those social forces that give rise to future 
discrimination.  Title VII, which was a part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, was fundamentally forward-looking legislation, and 
that purpose should not be ignored.   
         The effort to remedy the consequences of past 
discrimination (such as the "patterns of segregation and 
hierarchy" referred to in Weber, 443 U.S. at 208), cannot be 
isolated from the statute's broader aim to eliminate those 
patterns that were potential causes of continuing or future 
discrimination.  The causal relationship is illustrated by the 
industry at issue in Weber, where the Court noted that the 
ongoing imbalance in the hiring of craftworkers had its roots in 
a history of discrimination that had excluded Blacks from craft 
unions and thus prevented them from acquiring the necessary 
qualifications.  Id. at 198.  In describing the overarching goal 
toward which the Civil Rights Act was aimed, the House Report 
spoke of the need to "eliminat[e] all of the causes and 
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against 
minorities."  H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 
18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 (emphasis 
added).   
         Thus, using the approach taken in Weber and Johnson as 
a springboard, actions consistent with and in furtherance of the 
broad statutory goal of eliminating the causes of discrimination 
are not per se proscribed by Title VII.  This generation of young 
people may not recall that in 1964 racial homogeneity in schools 
was viewed as among the most fundamental and pernicious aspects 
of the social pattern undergirding the system of discrimination 
that the Civil Rights Act sought to dismantle.  In the years 
leading up to the Act's passage, school integration was one of 
the focal points of the civil rights movement.  The Senate Report 
accompanying the 1972 amendments to Title VII, when it was 
expanded to cover state and local governments, noted the 
connection between racial homogeneity in schools and attitudes 
that lead to discrimination: 
              It is difficult to imagine a more 
              sensitive area than educational 
              institutions where the youth of the 
              Nation are exposed to a multitude of 
              ideas and impressions that will strongly 
              influence their future development.  To 
              permit discrimination here [among 
              faculty and staff] would, more than in 
              any other area, tend to promote existing 
              misconceptions and stereotypical 
              categorizations which in turn would lead 
              to future patterns of discrimination. 
S. Rep. No. 415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971)).   
         In other contexts, the Court has repeatedly recognized 
racial diversity in the classroom as an important means of 
combatting the attitudes that can lead to future patterns of 
discrimination.  As Justice Stevens observed in Wygant: 
         In the context of public education, it is 
         quite obvious that a school board may 
         reasonably conclude that an integrated 
         faculty will be able to provide benefits to 
         the student body that could not be provided 
         by an all-white, or nearly all-white, 
         faculty.  For one of the most important 
         lessons that the American public schools 
         teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural 
         and national backgrounds that have been 
         brought together in our famous "melting pot" 
         do not identify essential differences among 
         the human beings that inhabit our land.  It 
         is one thing for a white child to be taught 
         by a white teacher that color, like beauty, 
         is only "skin deep"; it is far more 
         convincing to experience that truth on a day- 
         to-day basis during the routine ongoing 
         learning process. 
476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Johnson, 480 
U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting educational benefit 
to be derived from racial diversity, "'by dispelling for black 
and white students alike any idea that white supremacy governs 
our social institutions'" (quoting Sullivan, The Supreme Court-- 
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action 
Cases, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 78, 96 (1986))); Washington v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) ("Attending an 
ethnically diverse school may help . . . prepar[e] minority 
children 'for citizenship in our pluralistic society,' while, we 
may hope, teaching members of the racial majority 'to live in 
harmony and mutual respect' with children of minority 
heritage."(citations omitted)); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 
443 U.S. 449, 461, 467 (1979) (disapproving policies that 
"deprive black students of opportunities for contact with and 
learning from white teachers, and . . . deprive white students of 
similar opportunities to meet, know and learn from black 
teachers"); Kromnick v. School District of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 
894, 905 (3d Cir. 1984)("Schools are great instruments in 
teaching social policy [from which students learn] from the 
images and experiences that surround them . . .  a spirit of 
tolerance and mutual benefit."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 
(1985).  
         It is "ironic indeed" that the promotion of racial 
diversity in the classroom, which has formed so central a role in 
this country's struggle to eliminate the causes and consequences 
of racial discrimination, is today held to be at odds with the 
very Act that was triggered by our "Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice."  Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.  Nor 
does it seem plausible that the drafters of Title VII intended it 
to be interpreted so as to require a local school district to 
resort to a lottery to determine which of two qualified teachers 
to retain, rather than employ the School Board's own educational 
policy undertaken to insure students an opportunity to learn from 
a teacher who was a member of the very group whose treatment 
motivated Congress to enact Title VII in the first place.  In my 
view, the Board's purpose of obtaining the educational benefit to 
be derived from a racially diverse faculty is entirely consistent 
with the purposes animating Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 
         The majority criticizes the Board's use of caselaw 
construing the Equal Protection Clause in this Title VII case, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's explicit statement in Johnsonthat 
Title VII's constraint on affirmative action was "not 
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution."  480 U.S. 
at 628 n.6.  Nothing in the Court's language in the Johnsonfootnote 
suggests that we confine it to the particular factual 
context in which it was made, and the Court is certainly 
sufficiently articulate to limit its language when so inclined.  
Nor is the Johnson footnote the only place where the Court 
signified its understanding that Title VII imposes fewer 
limitations on employers' voluntary affirmative action than does 
the Constitution.  In Weber, the Court spoke of the "narrowness 
of [its] inquiry" since the plan did not involve state action and 
hence did not present an alleged violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, Weber, 443 U.S. at 200, and later stated that 
"Title VII . . . was not intended to incorporate and 
particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments."  Id. at 206 n.6 (quoted in Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 
n.6).  The latter statement was not made in a discussion that had 
to do with the "factual predicate" for demonstrating the need for 
remedial affirmative action, as the majority would confine the 
similar language in Johnson.   
         In any event, ultimately it is the Supreme Court rather 
than this one that will decide whether Title VII allows an 
employer more discretion to implement race-conscious employment 
policies than does the Constitution in the employer's effort to 
promote the underlying goals of the Act.  But, in the absence of 
any dispositive precedent, I believe it would be shortsighted for 
us to disregard the Supreme Court's statements regarding the 
advantages of diversity in an educational context when examining 
the limited use to which diversity was used as a factor in the 
Board's decision here.  In Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), where the Court 
considered a University of California affirmative action program 
for student admissions, Justice Powell, who announced the 
judgment of the Court, recognized that a diverse student body 
leads to a "robust exchange of ideas," id. at 312 (quoting 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)), and 
noted that the "essential" elements of academic freedom include 
the ability not only to select the student body but to determine 
"who may teach," id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234, 263 (1957)).   
         In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
(1986), the Court held that preferential protection against 
layoffs afforded to minority teachers by the public school 
board's affirmative action plan could not be sustained, because 
the school board's proffered justification for the plan -- that 
minority teachers were needed to provide role models for minority 
students -- was not sufficiently compelling to withstand the 
strict scrutiny to which it was subject under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 274-276 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., 
Rehnquist, J. and O'Connor, J.); id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring).  However, 
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion which was the 
decisive vote in the Court's holding, specifically distinguished 
the goal of providing role models from "the very different goal 
of promoting racial diversity among the faculty," explicitly 
leaving open the possibility that the latter goal might be 
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster.  Id. at 
288 n.*.  She also made a favorable reference to Justice Powell's 
endorsement of diversity in the classroom in Bakke, stating, 
"although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in 
the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 
'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to 
support the use of racial considerations in furthering that 
interest."  Id. at 286.  Her position, plus that of the four 
dissenting justices, (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan 
& Blackmun, JJ.) (seeking "to achieve diversity and stability for 
the benefit of all students" through faculty integration is a 
constitutionally sufficient purpose); id. at 315 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("'recognition of the desirability of multi-ethnic 
representation on the teaching faculty'" is a "completely sound 
educational purpose" (citation omitted)), meant there were five 
justices in Wygant who approved in general terms the concept that 
the educational benefit derived from diversity in the classroom 
can constitute an acceptable justification for affirmative 
action.  See also Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 
819 F.2d 766, 773 n.1 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (Flaum & Bauer, JJ., 
concurring) ("Remedying past discrimination is not necessarily 
the only government purpose sufficiently compelling to justify 
the remedial use of race.  Providing faculty diversity may be a 
second."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 (1987); Zaslawsky v. Board 
of Education of Los Angeles, 610 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1979)(in 
equal protection context, purpose of "enhanc[ing] the educational 
opportunities available to the students by achieving better 
racial balance in the teaching faculty . . .  has been well 
recognized and approved by the Supreme Court").   
         I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority, 
both in its construction of Weber and Johnson as leaving no doors 
open for any action that takes race into consideration in an 
employment situation other than to remedy past discrimination and 
the consequential racial imbalance in the workforce, and in what 
appears to be its limited view of the purposes of Title VII.  I 
would hold that a school board's bona fide decision to obtain the 
educational benefit to be derived from a racially diverse faculty 
is a permissible basis for its voluntary affirmative action under 
Title VII scrutiny.   
                               III. 
         It is undeniable that, in the abstract, a layoff 
imposes a far greater burden on the affected employee than a 
denial of promotion or even a failure to hire.  In this case, 
however, it cannot be said with any certainty that Taxman would 
have avoided the layoff had the Board's decision not been race- 
conscious.  If a random selection had been made, Taxman would 
have had no more than a fifty-percent chance of not being laid 
off.  Thus, this was not a situation where Taxman had a 
"legitimate and firmly rooted expectation" of no layoff.  
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638; cf. Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 
1273, 1278 (1st Cir. 1992) (where, even in absence of affirmative 
action scheme, White applicants "could not reasonably have felt 
assured that they would be appointed," plan did not disturb any 
legitimate expectations), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1043 (1993). 
         This differs from the situation of an employee who is 
next in line for a promotion by the objective factor of 
seniority.  Taxman's qualifications were merely equal to those of 
her competitor for this purpose.  In Johnson the Court held that 
because there were six other employees who also met the 
qualifications for the job, Johnson had no "entitlement" or 
"legitimate firmly rooted expectation" in the promotion, even 
though he had scored higher than the others on the qualifying 
test.  See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 
1408 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirmative action plan valid under Title 
VII where it never requires hiring unqualified person over 
qualified person), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992); cf. United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177-78 (same under equal 
protection).  Moreover, just as the plaintiff in Johnson remained 
eligible for promotion in the future, 480 U.S. at 638, Taxman 
retained recall rights after her layoff, and did in fact regain 
her job. 
         The majority relies in part on Wygant, where the 
Supreme Court found that the use of faculty layoffs to meet 
affirmative action goals in a public school system imposed too 
heavy a burden on White employees.  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.  
However, the Court's holding that the Wygant plan was not 
"narrowly tailored" for purposes of an equal protection challenge 
is not dispositive of the present inquiry as to whether a plan 
"unnecessarily trammels" the rights of White employees for Title 
VII purposes.  Not only was a different legal standard applicable 
but Wygant is also distinguishable because the Wygant plan caused 
nonminority teachers with more seniority to be laid off in order 
to retain minority teachers with less seniority.  Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 282.  The Wygant plan actually caused teachers to be laid 
off who, in the absence of the plan, would have had no risk of 
layoff.  That burden -- increasing the chance of layoff from zero 
to one hundred percent -- is significantly heavier than that 
imposed on Taxman, who would have had a substantial chance of 
being laid off even absent any consideration of diversity.   
         Only three members of the Court subscribed to language 
in the plurality opinion in Wygant suggesting that the use of 
layoffs to accomplish affirmative action goals will never survive 
strict scrutiny.  See 476 U.S. at 284.  The two concurring 
justices did not go that far.  See id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[n]or is it necessary, in my view, to resolve the 
troubling question[] whether any layoff provision could survive 
strict scrutiny"); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring) (confining 
his conclusion to the specifics of the layoff policy at issue).  
Therefore I do not read Wygant to hold that no race-conscious 
layoff decision will survive Title VII scrutiny. 
         The majority gives a similarly narrow reading to Weberand 
Johnson, construing these cases to impose a wooden, 
"unequivocal" requirement that all affirmative action plans must 
be explicitly temporary in order to be valid.  Majority 
Typescript at 40.  In fact, the Johnson plan itself "contain[ed] 
no explicit end date," Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639, and the Court 
indicated that only certain plans that are particularly 
burdensome on nonminorities in other respects need necessarily be 
expressly temporary.  "Express assurance that a program is only 
temporary may be necessary if the program actually sets aside 
positions according to specific numbers."  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 
639-40 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court's references to the 
temporary duration of the plans at issue in Weber and Johnson are 
more accurately construed as an understandable effort to assure 
that race does not become a permanently embedded consideration in 
employment decisions.  The significant consideration is whether 
there has been an effort "to minimize the effect of the program 
on other employees," not whether the underlying policy is set to 
run a specified number of years.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640.   
          In the situation before us, I see ample basis from 
which to deduce an effort to minimize the effect of the Board's 
affirmative action policy on non-minority employees.  One such 
aspect is the discretionary nature of the policy.  The Board is 
free not to apply the policy, even to break a tie.  Also 
significant is the infrequency with which the Board has resorted 
to the policy.  Although it may be of little comfort to Taxman, 
the fact that this is the first time in the twenty years since 
the policy was adopted that it has been applied to a layoff 
decision demonstrates the minimum impact on White teachers as a 
whole.  And since, by its own terms, it only applies in the rare 
instances in which two candidates are of different races but 
equal qualifications and the department in question is not 
already diverse, it is likely that it will continue to be 
infrequently applied.  See District Court's Final Judgment and 
Contingent Order, entered February 15, 1994 at 2 (denying request 
for broad injunction because "[t]here is, in the court's view, no 
likelihood that the conduct at issue in this case will recur"). 
         In this connection, I deem it further evidence of the 
Board's interest in minimizing any adverse effect on non- 
minorities that it has not defined diversity by any specific 
numerical goal.  Although the majority regards that as a major 
concern, I view the lack of any such figure as an indication that 
the Board's plan does not impose a fixed quota with the rigidity 
attendant thereto. 
         It is not the province of this court to intrude into 
what is essentially an educational decision.  Once we have 
determined that promoting faculty diversity for educational 
purposes can be a valid justification for an appropriately 
limited race-conscious action, it is not our role to second-guess 
the judgment of educators as to the level of diversity that 
produces the educational environment they deem appropriate.   
The Board's action is an attempt to create an educational 
environment that will maximize the ability of students to address 
racial stereotypes and misconceptions born of lack of 
familiarity.  I find it difficult to believe that an Act that was 
given birth by the tensions of the civil rights era precludes it 
from doing so under the facts before us here.  Given the record 
before us, the consequence of the narrow reading that the 
majority gives Weber and Johnson is the very irony that the 
Supreme Court said would result from interpreting this civil 
rights statute in a manner divorced from its historic context.  
As the Court noted in Weber: 
         [i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a 
         Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and 
         intended to improve the lot of those who had "been 
         excluded from the American dream for so long," 110 
         Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 
         constituted the first legislative prohibition of all 
         voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish 
         traditional patterns of racial segregation and 
         hierarchy. 
 
Weber, 443 U.S. at 204. 
         I return to the question raised at the outset:  whether 
Title VII requires that the Board toss a coin to make the layoff 
selection between equally situated employees.  In his opinion for 
the majority in Weber, Justice Brennan noted the distinction made 
by Congress between requiring and permitting affirmative action 
by employers.  See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06.  He deemed it 
important that, while Congress explicitly provided that Title VII 
should not be interpreted to require any employer to grant 
preferential treatment to a group because of its race, Congress 
never stated that Title VII should not be interpreted to permitcertain 
voluntary efforts. 
         In this case, the majority gives too little 
consideration to the tie-breaking method that its holding will 
impose on the Board.  It points to no language in Title VII to 
suggest that a lottery is required as the solution to a layoff 
decision in preference to a reasoned decision by members of the 
School Board, some of whom are experienced educators, that race 
of a faculty member has a relevant educational significance if 
the department would otherwise be all White.  While it may seem 
fairer to some, I see nothing in Title VII that requires use of a 
lottery.   
         Because I cannot say that faculty diversity is not a 
permissible purpose to support the race conscious decision made 
here and because the Board's action was not overly intrusive on 
Taxman's rights, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment 
for Taxman under Title VII and direct that summary judgment be 
granted to the School Board. 
Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Piscataway, 94-5090/5112 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Chief Judge 
Sloviter joins. 
 
         While I find much with which I agree in the majority's 
opinion, I am constrained to express my disagreement because I 
believe education presents unique concerns. 
         In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978), Justice Powell recognized that "the 'nation's future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas 
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."  
Id. at 313 (citation omitted).  As he noted, in the university:  
"[A] great deal of learning occurs . . . through interactions 
among students of both sexes, of different races, religions, and 
backgrounds . . . ."  Id. at 312-13 n.48 (citation omitted).  
Eighteen years later, the wisdom of this statement resonates as 
strongly as ever.  When added to a university's high academic 
standards, this exposure constitutes a formidable educational 
experience. 
         In this case, the Piscataway Board of Education 
concluded that a diverse faculty also serves a compelling 
educational purpose; namely, it benefits students in the business 
department by exposing them to teachers with varied backgrounds.  
The Board implemented a program that, in limited circumstances, 
allows consideration of race as a factor in school employment 
decisions.  The Board did not countenance the layoff of a more- 
qualified teacher in the place of a less-qualified one.  It did 
not prefer teachers junior in seniority to those with more 
experience.  Rather it concluded that when teachers are equal in 
ability and in all other respects--and only then--diversity of 
the faculty is a relevant consideration. 
         I do not believe Title VII prevents a school district, 
in the exercise of its professional judgment, from preferring one 
equally qualified teacher over another for a valid educational 
purpose. 
         Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge McKee joins, dissenting. 
         I join in Chief Judge Sloviter's dissent, as well as 
those of each of my dissenting colleagues. 
         I would only add that we should be mindful of the 
effects the majority's approach will impose upon legitimate, 
thoughtful efforts to redress the vestiges of our Nation's 
history of discrimination in the workplace and in education; 
efforts which, in seeking to achieve pluralism and diversity, 
have helped define and enrich our offices and institutions, and 
which were intended to open, and keep open, the doors of 
opportunity to those who have "been excluded from the American 
dream for so long."  See 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (excerpted 
from Sen. Humphrey's remarks).  This, after all, is what I had 
always thought Title VII was intended to accomplish.  More 
importantly, as Chief Judge Sloviter notes, these goals are 
plainly supported by the statute's legislative history.  Thus, 
while the majority holds that Title VII only allows race to be 
considered in remedying a history of intentional discrimination 
or a "manifest imbalance," I believe this conclusion is 
fundamentally at odds with the overriding goals of the statute.  
And the real-life impact of the majority's unprecedented 
construction of Title VII is readily apparent when one 
contemplates the myriad of difficult decisions that employers 
across the nation face everyday. 
         Somewhere out there in the real world, for example, 
there is a law firm with a racial make-up (a workforce) akin to 
Piscataway High School's; a firm which lacks a history of 
intentional discrimination in hiring but, due to economic 
concerns, must decide between retaining one of two attorneys -- 
the first and only black associate to work in its prestigious 
anti-trust department, or his equally qualified white 
counterpart.  The firm's management committee may decide that to 
lay-off the black associate would be an unwise and potentially 
damaging business decision because it would negate the large 
investment of time, effort and money spent trying to recruit and 
retain minority lawyers.  In other words, the firm may believe 
that diversity would be good for business and good for itself, 
so, everything else being equal, it decides to lay-off the white 
associate. 
         In a situation such as this, the firm's reliance upon 
race as one among many factors in making its decision is the type 
of management prerogative which is totally consistent with the 
goals and underlying purpose behind Title VII.  See Weber, 443 
U.S. at 206 (noting that Title VII's legislative history 
demonstrates that the statute was not intended to place 
unnecessary limits upon "management prerogatives").  After it 
reads the majority's decision, however, it seems clear that the 
firm will be forced to disregard its own better business 
judgment, forsake its recent recruiting successes among 
minorities and, I suppose, flip a coin on its own future as well 
as the young associates', all in order to avoid the specter of 
Title VII liability and an enormous damage award. 
         At times, a private college, with a handful of 
minorities on its faculty and with no history of intentional 
discrimination in hiring, is faced with the unenviable task of 
deciding which of two young associate professors with 
indistinguishable records to grant tenure in a particular 
department.  The only difference between the two is that one is 
white and the other is Latino.  After reviewing all of the other 
factors and finding them in equipoise, the tenure committee may 
decide to offer the position to the Latino associate professor 
because there has never been a tenured Latino professor in any 
department at the college, and because it believes his presence 
at the college will be a significant benefit to the entire 
student body.  As with the law firm, this decision is entirely 
consistent with Title VII because it is motivated by some of the 
same concerns that lead Congress to enact the statute.  SeeWeber, 443 U.S. 
at 208 (noting that the plan was valid under 
Title VII in part because the "purposes . . . mirror those of the 
statute"). 
         But again, the majority's rationale will thwart the 
college's ability to rely upon its independent judgment in 
deciding what is in the best interests of the students whom it is 
charged with educating.  Instead, according to the majority, that 
important judgment is better exercised (in this case may only be 
exercised) by resorting to a coin-flip. 
         One could cite countless other examples of the 
significant and ultimately counterproductive effects of the 
majority's narrow construction of Title VII, but suffice it to 
say that in my view, Title VII was not enacted to prevent the 
thoughtful, deliberative processes employed by such a law firm or 
college.  I believe that in this case the school board's decision 
to consider race, among other factors, in an attempt to ensure a 
diverse faculty for its students was in furtherance of Title 
VII's goal of breaking-down "existing misconceptions and 
stereotypical categorizations which in turn lead to future 
patterns of discrimination."  See S. Rep. No. 415, 92nd Cong., 
1st Sess. 12 (1971).  Accordingly, its decision was as legal as 
it was laudable. 
         I believe the majority's decision eviscerates the 
purpose and the goals of Title VII.  I respectfully 
dissent.Taxman v. Board of Education of the Twp. of Piscataway   
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom SLOVITER, Chief Judgeand 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge join. 
         I join each the opinions of my dissenting colleagues, 
but write only to elaborate upon what I consider to be important 
considerations in our analysis.  "The prohibition against racial 
discrimination in §§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII must [ ] be read 
against the background of the legislative history of Title VII 
and the historical context from which the Act arose."  United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).   
         We have now come full circle. A law enacted by Congress 
in 1964 to move this country closer to an integrated society and 
away from the legacy of "separate but equal" is being interpreted 
as outlawing this Board of Education's good faith effort to teach 
students the value of diversity.  The selection of Ms. Williams 
meant that the business department would retain the only Black 
teacher tenured in that department in anyone's memory.  Board 
President Theodore H. Kruse testified that it was his "general 
feeling . . . that it was valuable for the students to see in the 
various employment roles a wide range of background[s]" and that 
diversity "was also valuable to the work force and in particular 
to the teaching staff."  Da74.  Kruse further explained that "by 
retaining Mrs. Williams it was sending a very clear message that 
we feel that our student population is culturally diverse and 
there is a distinct advantage to students . . . to be made . . . 
more aware, more tolerant, more accepting, more understanding of 
people of all background[s]."  Da75.  I can not believe that 
Title VII was intended to strike down such an action.  
         As Chief Judge Sloviter points out, the majority's 
ruling is based upon an interpretation of United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
480 U.S. 616 (1987) that conflicts with the language used in 
those cases.  See Typescript at 10-11 (Sloviter, C.J., 
dissenting).  The majority's conclusion that affirmative action 
plans not limited to attempts to remedy past discrimination run 
afoul of Title VII simply ignores the legislative history that 
Weber and Johnson require us to consider.  
                    Given the interpretation of [Title VII] the 
                    Court adopted in Weber, I see no reason why 
                    the employer has any duty, prior to granting 
                    a preference to a qualified minority 
                    employee, to determine whether his past 
                    conduct might constitute an arguable 
                    violation of Title VII.  Indeed, in some 
                    instances the employer might find it more 
                    helpful to focus on the future.  Instead of 
                    retroactively scrutinizing his own or 
                    society's possible exclusions of minorities 
                    in the past to determine the outer limits of 
                    a valid affirmative-action program -- or 
                    indeed, any particular affirmative-action 
                    decision -- in many cases the employer will 
                    find it more appropriate to consider other 
                    legitimate reasons to give preferences to 
                    members of under-represented groups.  
                    Statutes enacted for the benefit of minority 
                    groups should not block these forward-looking 
                    considerations. 
          480 U.S. at 646-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).  This is 
particularly true in the field of education where young people 
are developing opinions and beliefs that will determine their 
attitudes as citizens, and this country's future.  Under such 
circumstances, the School Board considered Ms. Williams' race as 
a factor that was weighed in the balance with all other factors 
in making a very difficult choice between two equally fine 
teachers. 
         Similar consideration of an employee's sex has been 
upheld in Johnson.  There, the Court stated:  
                    We therefore hold that the Agency 
                    appropriately took into account as one factor 
                    the sex of [the employee] in determining that 
                    she should be promoted to the road dispatcher 
                    position.  The decision to do so was made 
                    pursuant to an affirmative action plan that 
                    represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case 
                    approach to effecting a gradual improvement 
                    in the representation of minorities and women 
                    in the Agency's work force. Such a plan is 
                    fully consistent with Title VII, for it 
                    embodies the contribution that voluntary 
                    employer action can make in eliminating the 
                    vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.  
                     
          480 U.S. at 641-42.  Thus, I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that "there is no congressional recognition of 
diversity as a Title VII objective requiring accommodation."  
Maj. Op. at 24. 
         To be sure, I can understand the majority's concern 
over allowing race to be a factor in any decision.  History 
loudly proclaims the evil that can spring from such practices, 
and it is sometimes all too easy to simply ignore that evil when 
the practice appears to be driven by a benign purpose.  However, 
I do not believe that what the Board of Education was attempting 
to do here, nor the individualized manner in which it was 
attempting to do it, runs afoul of a Congressional enactment 
cloaked in the legislative history recounted herein, and in the 
opinions of my colleagues.   
         Not that long ago the President's Commission on Civil 
Disorders (the "Kerner Commission") warned that "[o]ur nation is 
moving toward two societies, one black, one white -- separate and 
unequal."  Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
at 
1 (March 1, 1968).  Some may view the Board's efforts here as yet 
another push in that direction. Indeed, if we were writing upon a 
clean slate that would no doubt be true.  But of course, we do 
not do that.  The shadows and images that moved Congress to enact 
Title VII in 1964 are already etched into our slate, and they 
define the reality that should guide our analysis.  The Board has 
responded to those shadows with an action that is a narrow, 
individualized  and reasoned attempt to foster respect for 
diversity.  Because that is consistent with the purposes of Title 
VII, I respectfully dissent.  
